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Chapter 8 
 
Rubber smallholders’ flexibility 
No windfall, no crisis  
 
Eric Penot     and    François Ruf 
 
 
A few decades ago rubber was one of the first tree crops to be characterized by a spectacular 
breakthrough, the production of new, highly productive clonal material. With regard to 
rubber, the adoption of clonal planting materials led to a spectacular improvement in labour-
productivity and revenues. It requires also different cropping patterns during immature 
period. 
 
An increase in return to labour costs is usually the first priority of smallholders. As this 
adoption of clones by smallholders only started in the 1970s in Indonesia, this is an extremely 
important strategy which must be stressed before we begin to analyze the impact of the 
krismon (a contraction of “Krisis Monetar” in Indonesian  or “monetary crisis”).  With 
regard to rubber, there is clearly a dualism of seedlings and clonal material.  This dualism is 
more important than with other tree crops. Rubber seedlings are often grown under a complex 
agroforestry system and  nicknamed locally ‘jungle rubber’.  Clonal rubber is generally 
grown in monoculture sometimes with intercrops during the first three years.“Even when 
computing the cost of the investment and the credit that has to be repaid, the net income per 
hectare and per labour day from a clonal plantation is at least 50% higher (sometimes 100%) 
than the income from a jungle rubber plantation” (Gouyon 1999, 31).    
 
What was the situation before krismon?  Due to capital and information constraints, only 
15% of the smallholders already had access to highly productive clonal material rubber in 
1996.  This percentage was achieved, first and foremost, through official projects.  Then in 
the late 1990s, the “copying effect” started playing its role, however rather limited.  More and 
more farmers were able to observe the advantages of clonal material.  This led to a booming 
network of private nurseries that helped to accelerate the adoption of this material.  This 
means that a relatively strong dynamism was observed before krismon.  It also means that 
most clonal plantations are still young, which is important in terms of potential response to 
price changes (Chapter 1).   
 
However, when krismon arrived, around 85% of traditionnal rubber farmers still relied on 
ageing jungle rubber with limited productivity.  How may krismon influence these ‘jungle 
rubber’ and ‘clonal’ farming systems?  Is it going to accelerate or reduce the investment in 
rubber plantings?  Is it going to help to accelerate the adoption of clones?  
 
In 1998, rubber farmers did not benefit from the spectacular windfall, which affected cocoa 
and coffee (Chapters 5-7).  Can this be explained by the different performances of farming 
systems or by variations of the International market?  Is there a direct relationship between 
the decline of global prices and the interference of the Asian crisis in Indonesian rubber 
supply and exports (Chapter 2)?  
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How did the monetary crisis affect the other dramatic changes faced by Indonesian rubber 
smallholders?   
 
In addition to the economic crisis, as in other regions  of the country, the ecological crisis 
also struck Sumatra and Kalimantan in 1997-98.  Huge fires destroyed millions of hectares of 
forests, fallows and crops, including rubber.  Will both crisis reduce investment in clonal 
plantings?   
 
Eventually, regions such as West-Kalimantan were the theatre for grave social troubles 
related to conflicts between autochtons and some immigrants, especially spontaneous 
immigrants1.  A lack of confidence in the country’s regime was evident well before the 
crisis. Last but not least, oil palm development looms in traditional rubber regions.  Might it 
hamper the development of clonal rubber technology in Indonesia?  Does the crisis 
encourage the adoption of oil palm at the expense of rubber?  Does the crisis deepen the 
social imbalance between smallholders who already have access to clones and those who do 
not?   
 
To try to answer these questions , the paper is structured in 4 sections: 
1 A brief overview of the rubber sector  : the situation before krismon 
2 Krismon and its impact on rubber smallholdings 
3 The rubber crisis on the international market 
4 A conclusion including the future for the rubber smallholder sector 
 
1 A brief overview of the rubber sector 
 
1.1 Indonesian smallholders and the supply of world rubber 
 
Like cocoa, rubber as a product has experienced an extraordinary development during the 
20th century when the tree was transplanted from its native continent, South America.  Unlike 
cocoa, the development of rubber occurred in part in Africa but mostly in Southeast Asia. 
Indonesia benefited greatly in terms of its regional and international development (Fig.8.1).  
In the 1990s, Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia contributed 75% of the total world 
production of rubber.  Indonesia is the second largest rubber producer, close behind Thailand. 
 In Indonesia, in terms of non-oil exports, rubber is currently the fourth largest export after 
plywood, pulp and paper and oil palm.  In 1996-97, rubber was the third largest export, 
before oil palm.    
 
Indonesian smallholder production overtook estate production as early as the 1930s, and 
currently comprises 73% of the production of rubber and 85% of the total planted rubber area 
(DGE, 1998) .One of the last tree crops to be controlled by estates, both private and 
government, is oil palm, and since the early 1990s, most rubber estates moved to oil palm. 
    
Natural rubber is mainly used for the tyre industry (car, truck and plane), which accounts for 
70% of the product’s total use. Therefore, rubber demand is directly linked to the 
transportation sector, which is also constantly increasing.  Rubber farmers can rely on that 
strong worldwide demand and follow it with a solid supply response.  The prospect for 
 
1 Especially the Madurese spontaneous migrants. 
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rubber in terms of demand is clearly positive.  In fact, a supply shortage is expected 
somewhere between 2003 and 2008 (Burger K, 1994). There is currently around 1,2 million 
rubber farmers. The rubber sector as a whole in Indonesia is a source of income for more than 
10 millions people. 
  
1.2 From traditionnal jungle rubber to clonal plantations 
 
Indonesian smallholders used to develop an extensive and complex agroforestry system: the 
jungle rubber system, usually made up of rubber seedlings intercropped with a high number 
of other tree species all growing in a forest-like environment (Gouyon and Penot, 1995).  
 
Until the 1980s, ‘jungle rubber’ was an important source of incomes for many poor farmers 
in pioneer zones.  However, due to increasing land scarcity, its productivity per hectare and 
per year started to be insufficient to meet the new expenses posed by housing, children, 
education and health.  As most farmers still rely on ageing jungle rubber with a low and 
declining productivity, they face the need to improve their rubber cropping patterns though a 
process of intensification  based on the use of clones2 (Gouyon and Penot,1995).   
 
Despite the fact that financial returns are delayed by some 8 to 15 years, jungle rubber may 
still be an option for pioneer farmers in remote areas because it does not require much labour 
and inputs investments.  If farmers deal with poor soils, degraded Imperata grasslands and/or 
excess of rainfall for instance, as is the case in most areas of West Kalimantan, only clones, 
and their promise of returns after 5 years, offer a reasonable rubber option.   
 
In short, clonal rubber in monoculture came at the right time in the 1970s as an alternative to 
jungle rubber. Since the early 1980s, the government and international agencies have 
assigned an increasing importance to export-oriented tree crops.3 Clonal rubber has been 
popularised since the 1970s, through the dominant model of monoculture, but only 15% of 
the smallholders were able to access various types of rubber projects4.  The lack of technical 
information and skills for using clones, and lack of capital to invest in clonal rubber 
plantations have reduced the pace of the adoption of clones (Courbet and Penot 1997; 
Kelfoun and Penot 1997).  However since the late 1990s, private nurseries are booming due 
to a greater demand for clones, in particular in North and South-Sumatra, where rubber 
development projects had a greater impact.   
 
North Sumatra used to be the primary rubber-producing province (the “estate belt”), but in 
the 1990s rubber trees were partly replaced by oil palm.  Thus the province of South Sumatra 
now takes that  lead, followed by Jambi, West Kalimantan and the South/Central Kalimantan 
 
2 There is some other types of rubber improved planting material, in particular the polyclonal seedlings, but 
clones, obtained through grafting, are more homogenous, more productive and have better adaptation to local 
conditions through various degrees or tolerance to some diseases.  
3 Before then, and post 1965, the Indonesian  agricultural policy focused more on rice self-sufficiency, in 
particular on irrigated rice in Java (Chapters  9 and 10). 
4 Such a policy has been already adopted on a much larger scale for smallholders in Thailand and in Malaysia in 
the 1960s for political reasons (rubber was seen as a reliable source of income for local populations, in order to 
counter local uprisings).  Indonesia developed such a policy, somewhat belatedly, in the 1970s.    
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provinces.   
 
The plains of South Sumatra represent one of the regions in Indonesia most highly 
specialised in the production of rubber.  The province of South Sumatra is also one of the 
best showcases for the long-term positive impact of rubber projects, consolidated by a rubber 
research station (located in Sembawa).  This was the original source of clonal planting 
material. The presence of well skilled technicians and existing planting material  certainly 
helped to trigger the development of private nurseries, which enormously enhanced farmers’ 
opportunities to adopt their own clonal rubber systems.  In other provinces private nurseries 
are almost entirely absent (Bengkulu, Riau or Central Kalimantan) or are just being 
established in the late 1990s (Jambi and West Kalimantan).   
 
1.3 The situation before the ‘krismon’  
 
1.3.1 A typology of situations 
 
With regard to the adoption of rubber, three different areas can be identified in Indonesia:  
• the very remote or pioneer areas: such as Irian Jaya, the Molucas (Seram), and all the 
remaining zones on the outskirts of the central plains, or in the piedmont of the 
mountains (such as East Pasaman area in West Sumatra).  Jungle rubber is generally 
the only technology immediately accessible to poor farmers.5   
• the traditional jungle rubber based regions where the process of the adoption of clonal 
rubber is still embryonic: Jambi and West Kalimantan are quite typical examples of 
such. 
• the areas where projects had a very significant impact, in terms of the replanting of 
jungle rubber with more productive clonal rubber plantations.  In these areas, a 
private nursery network has been developed in order to supply the strong demand for 
improved planting material, thus enabling local farmers to invest in clonal rubber, 
typically so in North and South Sumatra. 
 
Our study areas, Jambi and West Kalimantan, are located in the area defined second.  This is 
typical of an “intermediate” area.  These are no longer pioneer zones, but they have not 
reached the stage of advanced capitalization.  In other words, the selected villages in these 
areas are representative of most of the farmers who will have to face a shift from traditional 
jungle rubber to more productive, clonal rubber based, cropping systems.  It can be roughly 
estimated that two thirds of rubber smallholders are in that position.  In addition, farmers who 
lack capital are vulnerable to offers made by private estates such a as a « credit and plantation 
package », with compensation with land such as the exchange of five to seven hectares of 
land for 2 hectares of established oil palm plantations. In the past, gouvernemental projects 
provided such packages (NES in particular). Since the mid 1990’s, private estates focused on 
oil palm production have replaced official projects.       
 
 
5 Rubber agroforests have been well described in Sumatra and Kalimantan (by Colfer et al, 1989,  H de Foresta, 
1990, Leti Sundawati, 1993, D.C.  Lawrence, 1996, N.  Salafsky, 1994, F.  Momberg, 1993, S Werner 1993, 
Thiollay, 1994, Kheowvongsri P. 1994 ).   
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1.3.2 A typology of farms 
 
In this “intermediate situation”, a village typology can be identified. This typology will be  
used to assess the impact of krismon according to the variety of situations. As is often the 
case, as exemplified by an analysis in terms of ‘ethnic’ criteria, a consideration of most tree 
crop booms highlights the parts played by differing access to land, labour and tree-capital. 
 
1.  “Traditional” local villages using only jungle rubber:  
These local villages are inhabited by people who can be considered as ‘autochtons’, that is to 
say people who came several generations ago and who have acquired local rights to land.  
They are Malayu in Jambi (village of Seppungur) and Dayak in Kalimantan (Kopar and 
Engkayu), still relying on the jungle rubber system.  They are constrained mainly by a lack of 
capital and of relevant technical information about clonal rubber cropping patterns. In the 
case of Kalimatan, another contraints are the age of the plantations and the lesser level of 
production compared to that of Jambi.  
 
2.  Local villages with access to clonal rubber developement schemes:  
These are also ‘autochtons’, either Dayak or Malayu.  In Kalimantan this type of village is 
exemplified by Sanjan and Embaong, where most farmers have one or two hectares of clonal 
rubber.  They generally have sufficient capital (from their project plots) and invest in further 
clonal rubber.  They may also seize the opportunity presented by oil palm projects, as is the 
case in Embaong.  Besides lack of the appropriate technical information, their main 
constraint is also the availability of clonal rubber planting material.  There are still very few 
private nurseries which provide planting material.  Quality and clonal purity is also a 
problem. 
 
3.  Javanese transmigrants in tree crop oriented transmigration schemes :  
These are villages which adopted plantations provided by the project early on; an example of 
one such is the NES (Nucleus Estate Scheme) of Rimbo Bujang in the Jambi province 
(comprising the villages of Sukamulia and Saptamulia).  Even before krismon, they were 
successful.    
 
4.  Javanese transmigrants in food crop-oriented transmigration sites :  
They initially had no rights to plant tree crops.  This is the case in Kalimantan, in the villages 
of Sukamulia and Trimulia.  Their main constraints are a lack of land (with an emerging land 
market) coupled with a lack of tree crops and so of the incomes brought by tree crops.  
Upland foodcrop farming is not adapted to these poor soils invaded by Imperata cylindrica.  
Some farmers got 0.4 to 0.8 ha of clonal rubber from the SRAP6 project in 1995.  Even 
before krismon, they were just surviving.   
 
5.  Local Dayak farmers in food crop oriented transmigration projects (Transmigrasi Lokal)  
They still have ageing jungle rubber in their former village but want to have access to road 
transportation and technical information (one example is the village of Pariban Baru).  Some 
 
6 SRAP : Smallholder Rubber Agroforestry Project, a joint research programme by CIRAD and ICRAF.  SRAP 
tried to test various Rubber agroforestry systems (RAS) through on-farm trials with farmers.     
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farmers had access to one hectare of clonal rubber through the PKR-GK7 (the “partial 
approach project”) in 1992. 
 
Regarding types 4 and 5, it must be stressed again that until 1992 tree crops were forbidden 
in these food crop oriented transmigration schemes.  Since 1992 some farmers have planted 
clonal rubber, either on their own or through small projects. This typology is representative 
of various situations in terms of access to projects, economical and ecological environments 
and ethnic groups. The analysis is based on farm incomes (detailed in Annex 1).  
 
1.3.3 The 1997 incomes 
 
There was a wide range of average yearly incomes from rubber per family within, what were 
historically, the main areas (between Rp1 250,000 to Rp 6,500,000).   The main source of on-
farm income is rubber (types 1, 2, 3, 5).  The only exceptions to this are those Javanese 
farmers who were trapped by food crop transmigration schemes (type 4) where off-farm 
employment provides most of the incomes. 
 
 
Table 8.1: Rubber and off-farm incomes for various types of situations (in x 1000 rupiah): situation in 
July 1997 before the crisis. 
Province/  
Villages  
JAMBI 
Rimbo 
Bujang 
 
JAMBI 
Seppungur 
 
KALIMANTA
N 
Sanjan & 
Embaong 
KALIMANT
AN 
Kopar & 
Engkayu 
KALIMANT
AN 
Trimulia & 
Sukamulia 
KALIMANTA
N 
Pariban Baru 
Ethnic group 
and type of 
cropping 
systems 
Javanese 
transmigrant
s in NES 
project with 
clonal rubber 
Traditional 
Malayu with 
jungle rubber 
Traditional 
Dayak in 
SRDP project 
with clonal 
rubber  
Traditional 
Dayak with 
jungle rubber 
Javanese in 
foodcrops 
oriented 
transmigratio
n project 
Local Dayak in 
“foodcrops 
Lokal 
Transmigrasi” 
project with 
jungle rubber 
and later clones 
Typology 3 1 2 1 4 5 
Rubber  
income  
5512 3240 2929 1014 96 680 
Sale of rice 
surpluses 
104 42 105 190 557 124 
Off-farm 
income 
814 830 330 360 997 450 
Total 
Gross income 
6700 4139 3704 1815 1932 1484 
Agricultural 
inputs 
270 27 340 251 282 230 
Net income   6430 4112 3364 1564 1650 1254 
Sources: Kelfoun A, Courbet, P., Penot E, 1997.    
 
 
                                                 
7 PKR-GK is a partial approach project from GAPKINDO, (the Rubber Association of Indonesia) providing 
farmers with clonal rubber and inputs for the first year only.  Implemented in 1992. 
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Off-farm activities 
After 1992, many of these Javanese transmigrants planted rubber, either clonal or more 
generally non-selected seedlings due to lack of capital or availability of planting material in 
the area, in their former foodcrop plot (lahan 1 or 2)8.  Most of these plantations, if not 
burned by the 1997 fires, are still immature or are just beginning to produce.  Therefore, 
these farmer’s average net income is the lowest.  Off-farm activities, mainly retail and rubber 
trade as well as estate jobs, provide an additional income for all types of farmers.  In the 
upper area of the Kapuas river, gold mining is also an important seasonal activity.  In Sintang 
transmigration areas, 80 % of off-farm income is linked with gold mining.  The remaining 20 
% is linked to work on oil palm estates.  In the Sanggau area, oil palm private estates provide 
most of the jobs for local or transmigrant farmers.    
 
Clones versus jungle rubber.   
The income from rubber is directly linked with its yield (see Table 8.2).  Clonal rubber is 2 to 
3 times more productive than jungle rubber with adapted clones9.  Besides this important 
yield gap between the two systems, the immature period for clonal rubber is only 5 to 6 years 
(as compared with 8 to 15 years for jungle rubber).  Farmers with clonal rubber plantations, 
whether or not this is provided by projects, have a higher income and standard of living than 
those relying only on jungle rubber, in particular those with very old jungle rubber (case 5). 
This explains why Dayak farmers attempt to join “local transmigration programmes”. They 
also require better access to roads and markets. 
 
Sumatra versus Kalimantan.   
Dayak farmers with clonal rubber (case 2) only have one hectare of clonal rubber with a 
clone, GT1, that suffers from leaf disease (Colletrotrichum).  This cuts yields by 30-50%, 
leading to a relatively poor income in comparison with the NES farmers with clonal rubber in 
Jambi (case 3).  Besides diseases, rubber in Kalimantan also suffers, as compared with Jambi, 
from poorer soils and a climate to which they adapt less easily (with a high rainfall which 
causes greater production losses).  This means lower yields in both jungle rubber and clones 
(Table 8.2).  In Jambi even ‘traditional’ farmers, using only jungle rubber (case 1), have a far 
better income due to their younger and more productive jungle rubber.  This allows a more 
productive area per family and some additional income from share-cropping.   
  
Rubber and rice 
Even before the crisis one could verify the assumption that clonal rubber engendered a 
spectacular breakthrough in terms of labour productivity and returns (Table 8.2).   
 
8 In food crop oriented transmigration projects, farmers are provided with 2 plots of 1 hectare, lahan 1 and 2, 
and an additional small plot of 0.5 ha for the house and the garden.  . 
9 Smallholder plantations with the PB 260 clone in SRDP project in South Sumatra have an average production 
of 1600-2000 kg/ha/year compared to 3 to 600 kg/ha/year with jungle rubber according to age. 
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Table 8.2: Return t   labour for various cropping systems in Jambi in July 1997 o  
 Cropping system 
 
Number of farmers 
 
 
Return to labour 
(.000 Rp manday) / 
Location 
 
 
 
Jambi 
 
West 
Kalimantan 
 
Jambi 
 
West Kalimantan 
 
Upland rice 
 
Shifting cultivation, 
 
2 
 
16 
 
8 000 
 
2100  
Sawah 
 
Local varieties 
 
7 
 
14 
 
4 800 
 
4100 
 
 
Improved varieties 
 
5 
 
8 
 
8 200 
 
8100 
 
Rubber 
 
Jungle rubber  
 
24 
 
100 
 
25 300 
 
9 600 
 
Rubber 
 
Clonal rubber 
monoculture  
Mature plantation 
 
7 
 
24 
 
61 8 00 
 
27 200 
Source : A Kelfoun, Ph Courbet, E Penot, 1997 
 
Most upland rice (« ladang ») produced by rubber smallholders is for their own consumption. 
Rice production is not sufficient however, and farmers use part of their rubber and off-farm 
incomes to buy rice.  Most farmers do not own sawah (irrigated paddy fields). Although 
upland rice cultivation is very limited in Jambi, it appears to be more labour efficient than in 
Kalimantan.  In both cases, and respectively in each province, the labour productivity of 
traditional “shifting” cultivation is far below that of jungle rubber (three to fourfold).  This 
explains the success of jungle rubber as the main local tree crop system adopted during the 
20th century in Sumatra and Kalimantan plains and its rapid spread as such.   
Since the 1970s clonal rubber has represented a new step in productivity and a new income 
niche for farmers who plant and/or replant their old jungle rubber with clones when they can 
afford it.      
 
2. Krismon and its impact on rubber smallholdings 
 
2.1 1998 and 1999 years of living dangerously : a quadruple crisis 
 
In 1998, despite an increase in the prices of their commodity, most rubber smallholders 
lacked the enthusiasm displayed by cocoa and coffee farmers.  This reflected the fact that 
they had to deal with more obvious disadvantages.  These can be summarized in terms of 
quadruple crisis: 
- An ecological crisis in 1997-98 with huge fires destroying some crops, including rubber, 
and taking a high toll specifically upon the Sumatran and Kalimantan plains, where 
rubber farmers are concentrated. 
- A financial crisis which did not generate a windfall such as that experienced by the 
coffee and cocoa growers.  Whereas in 1998 these commodity prices increased fivefold 
during the 2 or 3 months of peak harvest, rubber prices only tripled for 2 or 3 months and 
experienced a significant peak in production.   
- A social crisis entailing conflict between autochtons and migrants, Muslim and 
Christians, and between ‘native’ Indonesian and Chinese ethnic Indonesians.  This also 
took on a special dimension in the rubber producing regions of West Kalimantan. 
- A political crisis.  This led to social unrest and a lack of confidence on the part of the 
private sector in economic recovery, because many Chinese ethnic Indonesians are 
involved in the rubber industry the risk for the producer is certainly increased.     
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2.1.1 Prices changes and steps in the crisis for smallholders during the period 1997-1999  
 
As 75-90% of the income of rubber smallholders is provided by that crop, rubber prices are 
the main indicator of their economic evolution.  The price of rubber on the international 
market dropped from 130 US cents in July 1997 to around 60 US cents in mid-1998.  It 
remains around 55 cents in mid-1999 (Fig.8.3).  In the second half of 1997, the early stages 
of the rupiah’s decline enabled the price of rubber, paid in rupiah to the producer, to stabilize. 
The acceleration in the collapse of the rupiah, in January 1998, caused the price paid to the 
smallholder for his rubber to double and even triple for a few months (Figs. 8.3,  4a and 4b ). 
         
The effects of the crisis upon the farmers can be divided into four main periods:  
- The first period, from July 1997 to December 1997, appears to be a period in which the 
crisis had no effect.  Rubber prices, in rupiah, increased only slightly; to Rp 2265 from 
Rp 1950 per kg in West-Kalimantan (+16%) and to Rp 2630 from Rp 2025 per kg in 
Jambi.   
- The second period may be defined as  profiting from the crisis.  However, the fact that 
rubber prices remained high for only two months  (January to February 1998) meant that 
this period was far too short for farmers to take advantage of it.  More importantly, food 
prices also skyrocketed, especially the price of rice; this tripled in January 1998 due to 
local shortages.  This is one of the main differences between rubber farmers and cocoa 
farmers, who benefited from surpluses of rice in Sulawesi and therefore profited from the 
crisis for a longer period.   
- The third period is defined as entering the crisis.  Prices of agricultural inputs and food 
overtook the price commanded by rubber.  This led to a serious, though temporary, 
decrease in income and purchasing power due to the very low parity of the rupiah (March 
1998 to December 1998).  Most food prices kept increasing and remained at high levels 
at the end of 1998, leaving smallholders with a loss of purchasing power.  This trend is 
illustrated by the cost of imported rice from Vietnam or Assam or that of local rice ( 
Fig.8.5).  Most farmers were confused by this “price dance” and most did not understand 
the reasons for such price volatility. 
- The fourth period remains uncertain.  It could defined as an adjustment period, as the 
rupiah returned to around Rp 8,800 per US $ in April 1999 (then dipped to under Rp 
7,000 per US $ in July 1999 before again rising to Rp 8,000 per US $ in August).  Inputs 
and food prices look more or less stable (from January 1999 until June 1999).  On the 
other hand, the international rubber price kept sliding dangerously in mid-1999 and 
political issues, including the Aceh and Timor massacres, made political equilibrium 
extremely fragile.  Some staple food prices such as fish and meat remain extremely high 
in mid-1999.  Rice remains at three times the level it attained in mid-1997. 
 
However, in Jambi and West-Kalimantan the prices of other foodstuffs decreased slightly, to 
a level considered to be “relatively acceptable” by most rubber farmers in June 1999 (a 
decrease of around 30% as compared with prices in February 1999).  Still, in rupiah, labor 
costs in mid-1999 are “only” twice that of mid-1997.  Until March 1999, local products, such 
as planting material stumps, did not increase much in price.  They remained at around Rp 500 
per stump, and eventually increased in price to Rp 700 in June 1999.  Fertilisers tripled or 
even quadrupled in price (table 8.3), but farmers do not use them much, especially during the 
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mature phase.  Prices of locally produced fertilisers, such as urea, increased less than purely 
imported goods such as KCL. 
 
In June 1999, most rubber farmers considered prices to be almost back to “normal”, with the 
exception of fertilisers, but it is clear that they worry about renewed fluctuation in the price 
of rubber.  “Normal prices” for producers means that they do cover their average expenses 
and do not create any distorsion in the usual purchase power.  From their point of view, as 
rubber farmers, they moved from a relatively neutral ‘krismon’ in 1998 to the beginnings of a 
dangerous “commodity crisis” in 1999 (section 3). 
 
Table 8.3: Rubber and input prices in 1997, 1998 and 1999 in West-Kalimantan  
Item July 1997 July 1998 June 1999 Increase in 1999 
compared with 
1997 
Rubber farm gate price 
(DRC 100%) (Rp/kg) 
2400 4000 3500 x   1.5 
Local rice (Rp/kg) 1200 2000 3000 x   2.5 
Imported rice (Rp/kg) 1000 2400 2900 x   2.9 
Labour and land 
Labour cost (Rp/ manday) 3500 7000 7500 x   2.1 
Cost of fallow land(Rp/ha) 750,000  1,500,000 x   2 
Planting material 
Stump 300 550 700 x   2.3 
Plant in polybag 1000 1500 2000 x   2 
Fertilisers and herbicides 
Urea (Rp/kg) 400 450 1200 x   3 
KCl (Rp/kg) 600 900 3000 x   5 
SP 36 (Rp/kg) 
(TSP) 
600 700 1500 x   2.5 
Round-Up (Rp/liter) 25000 37000 42500 x   1.7 
  
 
2.1.2 The rubber/rice trade-off for the rubber farmer 
 
Rice is the staple food of Indonesia and is therefore a necessity.  As rice had one of the 
highest index levels in 1999, it deserves special attention (Table 8.4, Fig. 8.5).  West-
Kalimantan is far from being self-sufficient in the production of rice. The province has to 
import thousands of tonnes of rice from Sulawesi, Java and foreign countries.  This accounts 
for the fact that before the crisis rice in Indonesia was one of the highest priced goods.  It also 
accounts for the higher impact the crisis had upon rice prices. The comparative price of 
rubber, in comparison with rice, declined during the crisis. The poorest farmers, whose main 
expense is rice, suffered and had to reduce the proportion of rice in their diet.  For most 
rubber farmers, as the comparative price remained above 0.7 until June 1999, most 
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maintained their normal dietary pattern with regard to rice.  However, the families who were 
over-dependent upon rice, and this does not only include the poorest, crossed a dangerous 
line in June 1999. 
 
Table 8.4: relative price of rubber and rice in West Kalimantan in rupiah 
Date Exchange 
rate 
Rubber price (dry sheet 70 
% DRC) 
Rice Amount of rice for 1 kg of 
wet rubber 
July 1997  2400 1500 1200 1.25 
January 1998 12000 4000 4500 0.89 
June 1998 10000 3000 2500 0.86 
September 1998 8000  
3000 
3800 0.79 
November 1998 6500 3000 3400 0.88 
January 1999 8700 3000 3700 0.76 
March 1999 8500 3500 3500 1 
April 1999 8500 2500 3200 0.78 
June 1999 7300 1850 2700 0.69 
Note: farm gate rubber prices are that of rubber dry sheet with a Dry Rubber Content (DRC) of 75 % ( a 
particularity of West Kalimantan when all other provinces produce cup lumps with a DRC of 45-50 %).  
Therefore, rubber sheet price is of course above that of slab or cup-lump price.  Source : Survey SRAP 97/99. 
 
2.1.3 Impact of Krismon on costs and investment 
 
Rubber production has few requirements, other than labour.  The main input necessary is 
formic acid for latex coagulation.  Cost of production is therefore mainly linked to labour 
costs, especially if share cropping is the dominant labour contract (as in Sumatra and Jambi 
for instance).  If both rubber and food prices double at roughly the same pace such increases 
provide few problems for the farmer. 
 
The main effect of krismon is upon the ability of the farmer to invest.  The tripling of the 
price of imported inputs, in particular herbicides (Round Up) and fertilizers may deter 
investment.  On the other hand, improved planting material became relatively less expensive 
until March/April 1999.  This constitutes 50% of the total investment during the first three 
years of a clonal rubber plantation.  Unfortunately, following demand, the price of improved 
planting material jumped by 40% in June 1999. 
 
If farmers can combine the use of clonal rubber with a decrease in the use of imported inputs, 
it might be less expensive to invest in clonal rubber system.  This seems possible in areas 
without Imperata cylindrica, where herbicides are not essential 
 
Transmigrant Javanese farmers still try to develop rubber plantations and are considering 
buying surrounding land in addition to their initial two hectares.  Land prices have been 
increasing since 1996.  In the Sanggau area of West Kalimantan, the average price of land 
was Rp 350,000 per ha in July 1997 (for Imperata grassland) and has jumped to 1.5 million 
rupiah in June 1999.   
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2.1.4 A partial conclusion  
 
With a volatile political situation, a major economic recession and 50% of the population 
classified in June 1999 as subsisting below the poverty line, as compared with an estimated 
15% before the crisis, Indonesia approaches the political situation it experienced in 1965, or 
something very close to that; 1965 was remembered as “the year of living dangerously”.10  
However, such a comparison is far from perfect and, political matters aside, there are 
differences which must be stressed. On one hand, Indonesia now possesses much less forest 
and fewer natural resources than it did in 1965.  There is also a higher density of population 
and there are increasing social conflicts.  These problems are to some extent offset by the 
present infrastructure and communications.  At this stage, it is clear that an export commodity 
such as rubber has given thousands of farmers an advantage in overcoming the crisis not 
possessed by the majority. 
 
2.2 Krismon impact on rubber smallhoder incomes 
 
In this section, the fluctuations of  rubber farmers incomes between July 1997 and January 
1999 in 6 villages are analysed with special attention to the variety of the impact of the crisis 
on various types of rubber households. 
 
2.2.1 1998: a neutral year for most rubber producers 
 
From estimated revenues in July 1997 and January-March 1999, we calculated indexes with 
July 1997 being the base 100. The rubber income index for January-March 1999 varies from 
237 to 370, averaging 281 (table 8.5).  This is similar to the value of food given by the price 
index (288, BPS) and slightly less than that of rice (250).  This confirms that the crisis does 
not seem to have really affected the gross purchasing power of most rubber producers.  
 
Table 8.5: Fluctuations of the income index from July 1997 to January-March 1999 
 Income indexes in January-March 1999 (July 1997 = base 100)  
 KALIMANTAN JAMBI 
 Dayak Dayak Dayak Javanese Malayu Javanese 
 SRDP 
project 
‘Traditional’ Local trans-
migration 
Food crop 
Trans- 
Migration 
‘Traditional’ 
 
 
NES 
Project 
Rubber income index 
in 1999 
261  237 292 256 300 370 
Net FARM income in 
Rp index 1999 
255 236 268 145 275 345 
In US $ index 1999 82 75 86 46 88 111 
 
 
Those who had simultaneous access to projects and to clonal rubber (Dayak local 
transmigration sites, SRDP farmers in Kalimantan and Javanese NES in Jambi) were clearly 
better able to endure the crisis than others.  This is not surprising, as clonal rubber provides 
                                                 
10  This reference is to a film which dramatised the 1965 crisis which led to the “New Order” of the 
Suharto government. 
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an income three times that of jungle rubber.  Farmers who continue to rely on good jungle 
rubber also follow this trend.  However, those relying on ageing jungle rubber saw only a 
small decrease in net farm income. 
   
Unsurprisingly, Javanese transmigrants in food crop schemes which weren’t producing 
rubber as most of their rubber plantations are still immature have the lowest net farm income, 
close to that of the wage index (148, BPS).  However off-farm job opportunities have been 
maintained (mostly in oil palm estates and in gold mining), and have even increased (see 
below).  Although off-farm income does not allow to cover the basic needs of the family, due 
to the low level of wages, most Javanese transmigrants in the Sanggau area (Kalimantan) 
consider krismon to have had little impact, mainly due to the fact that jobs in plantations and 
gold mining did not dry up.  This is probably the main difference between the situations 
which may be seen in Java or in urban areas. 
 
Except for some ‘traditional’ Dayaks in Kalimantan and a few Javanese in food crop 
transmigration schemes, most farmers were not badly affected by the crisis and maintained 
their purchasing power. In December-March 1999, there was no particular change in 
consumption patterns, except in those of the poorest families. However, consumption of meat 
and fish generally decreased due to the relatively high prices of these foods. In terms of total 
consumption this situation may be defined as “no more/no less”.  Discussions with farmers 
confirm that the crisis has been perceived more as a “potentially risky period” than as a real 
crisis.    
 
2.2.2 Off-farm activities 
 
Off-farm activities still remain essential in the case of transmigrants in Kalimantan, because 
their rubber plantations are still immature.  Many local rubber smallholders also work in 
plantations for certain periods of the year.  The older and less productive their jungle rubber, 
the more they work off-farm.  Jobs offered by estates have been maintained and even 
increased and the number of farmers involved in off-farm activities has also increased (table 
8.6).  Oil palm plantations have substantial labour requirements during the first three years.   
 
Table 8.6: Off-farm opportunities among 90 farmers in Sanggau, West Kalimantan, 1996 to 1998. 
 
Type of off farm activity 
 
1996 
 
1997 
 
1998 
 
oil palm workers in estates 
 
20 % 
 
24 % 
 
34 % 
 
Employees 
 
10 % 
 
13 % 
 
17 % 
 
Farmers with regular off- farm 
activities  
 
40 % 
 
48 % 
 
60 % 
Sources: survey by E.  Penot & I Komardiwan, May 1999. 
 
Off-farm activities for transmigrants have been widely maintained with an average period of 
activity of 9.8 months per year in 1997 to 10.1 months/year in 1998.  The maintenance of off-
farm opportunities seems to be confirmed.  However, the average estate worker’s wage index 
in January 1999 was only 200 (July 1997 = 100).  Wages increased less rapidly than rubber 
incomes.  Estates reacted to the crisis by reducing their labour costs.  In short, although off-
farm activities look stable before and after the crisis, off-farm incomes did not increase in the 
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same proportion as did inputs, food costs and rubber incomes. In June 1999 in West 
Kalimantan, the daily wages were between 6000 and 10 000 Rp in gold mining; the same 
applies to oil palm estates.  The basic daily wage on oil palm plantations is 7300 Rp, plus 
1500 Rp for the first extra hour and 2500 Rp for the second extra hour worked. 7500 rupiah 
per day can be considered to be the average cost of local labour (Table 8.3). 
 
2.3 Does krismon influence Indonesian rubber production? 
 
2.3.1 Increase in production and exports 
Indonesian rubber production constantly progressed, due to continuous jungle rubber planting 
in pioneer zones.  Since the 1980s, clonal rubber from project and some non-project farms 
has played an increasing role and increase its share of the total rubber production.  
In 1997, despite the El Nino effect, Indonesian rubber production hardly diminished, 
dropping from 1.574 million tonnes in 1996 to 1.564 million tonnes in 1997. According to 
BPS11 (DGE, 1998), production remained around 1.548 million tonnes in 1998 and 1.564 
million tonnes in 1999 (forecast).  The LMC bulletin provides a slightly higher figure with 
1.656 million tonnes in 1998 (a 6% increase from 1997).  Dr Budiman’s12 personal 
estimation is 1.6 million tonnes for 1998 (a 3% increase, Budiman 1999).   
 
Indonesian domestic rubber consumption dropped from 140,000 tons in 1996 to 100,000 tons 
in 1997.  Such consumption is mainly by tyre production13 (80 %).  This local industry was 
seriously affected by the crisis, and the local prices of tyres have tripled.  Finally, the 
transport business has moved to retread tyres (a technique which is 30% cheaper).  The crisis 
did not help the domestic tyre industry due its dependency upon imported products.14 But the 
impact on prices and Indonesian rubber production is not significant, as domestic 
consumption accounts for quite a small share of the market (9.76%) as compared to exports.  
  
 
The “El Nino” effect has nothing to do directly with krismon and price increases, but it is one 
more reason to believe that the supposed short-term, price-elasticity evident in supply in 
1998 was a marginal mechanism. 
 
2.3.2 No clear increase in the tapping of rubber trees to increase production 
 
Did the crisis trigger any change or intensification in the terms of tapping?  
Farmers enjoyed a high price, in rupiah, for 2 or 3 months in 1998.  Was a short-term supply 
 
11 BPS (Biro Pusat Statistiks, the Indonesian Central Statistics Bureau).   However, statistics were not officially 
released in 1999 due to the elections held in this year. 
12 Dr Budiman is the executive director of GAPKINDO, the Rubber Association of Indonesia, this represents 
all Indonesian rubber processors. 
13 The very first production of Indonesian synthetic rubber (annual capacity of 60 000 tons) happened in 1997 
with the company PT Sintetikajaya, belonging to the largest tyre producer in Indonesia   
14 Natural rubber constitutes only 22 % of the production cost of tyres.   93 % of the other inputs are imported, 
with a price set in US $.   
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response possible?  Could farmers have tried to cash in on the price fluctuation by increasing 
their level of production?  
There are, theoretically, two possible ways of increasing  yields almost overnight.   
 
Firstly: farmers can increase the tapping frequency of each mature tree and therefore increase 
production within one month.  This technique is especially suited to clonal plantations15. 
Technically, an immediate increase of production is possible but not sustainable in the long 
run and can destroy the rubber trees.  70 % of farmers surveyed in Kalimantan in May 1999 
declared that they did not tap their plots more frequently (I Komardiwan & E Penot, 1999).  
30% acknowledged that they had tried, but not for very long.  Discussions with local farmers 
in the Sintang and Sanggau areas in June 1999 confirmed that such a strategy is limited, and 
cannot be used for an extended period without causing serious harm to the trees.  As a joke, 
farmers talk about the “PSM” system, with three tappings a day (‘Pagi/Sore/Malam’ or 
Morning/Afternoon/Evening system) but nobody really does it. In Kalimantan, with trees 
suffering from leaf diseases, it is obviously not a potential strategy according to 
farmers’opinion. It might be different in South Sumatra with trees in good conditions.    
The second strategy is to tap additional jungle rubber trees. The average yield of jungle 
rubber is around 4 to 500 kg/ha/year, and 300 kg/ha/year  for ageing trees.  But jungle rubber 
is generally obtained from trees in a “park of jungle rubber”.  Jungle rubber yield per hectare 
varies according to the number of trees tapped.  Jungle rubber gardens have between 250 to 
450 ‘tappable’ trees per hectare according to the age of the plantation. Some might be put in 
reserve. This, theoretically, allow the farmer some flexibility and capacity of response to 
price changes. There are also some rubber plots kept in reserve as land markers or as 
“security plots”. In Kalimantan, such “jungle rubber reserves” are limited, but Sumatran 
farmers frequently have more jungle rubber than they can tap.  It is part of the logic of 
extensive farming systems and also helps to keep property rights alive. 
Our surveys in Jambi and Kalimantan did not suggest that the availability of labour was 
increasing in rural areas after the crisis.  They indicated no transfer of labour from Java or 
urban areas to the central Sumatran or Kalimantan rubber areas.  Farmers had a limited 
labour force before the crisis and that fact changed little after the crisis. Share–cropping, a 
common feature in Sumatra, might be locally more developed for a while in particular with 
the demand of off- farm work from transmigrants from food oriented projects.   
Moreover, 10-20 % of the total income of smallholders relying on jungle rubber was gained 
from off-farm opportunities, as estate workers in particular.  The interruption of the estates’ 
new plantation policy (oil palm, Acacia mangium) in 1998 did not reduce job opportunities 
(Table 8.6).  This policy did not, however, provide additional labour for the tapping old or 
remote jungle rubber.   
 
What conclusions should we draw from this?  There were some reports, from GAPKINDO  
and from newspapers, of this type of behaviour (taping more trees or more the trees).  It was 
used to account for an increase in supply and exports and thus for a decline in international 
 
15 (Clonal rubber in normal conditions (PB 260) produce 1 500 to 1800 kg of dry rubber per ha per year.  In 
West Kalimantan, the GT 1 clone produces only 1 000 to 1200 kg/ha due to leaf disease) (TCSDP, D Boutin, 
pers. com.) 
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rubber prices, as suggested in Chapter 2.  Our surveys tend to show that only a minority of 
farmers tried to increase their rubber supply overnight by using either of the two methods 
discussed above, although the figure may be higher for the most dynamic rubber producing 
regions such as South Sumatra.  Such methods could not have a significant impact on 
Indonesian rubber supply in the short/mid term and thus on the international price or rubber.  
   
 
Whilst rubber is a ‘refuge value’ and provides a reliable source of income despite price 
fluctuations, the ability of the rubber producers to adapt overnight to increases in supply (in 
order either to cash in on local price increases or to compensate for local price declines) is 
limited.   
 
3. The rubber crisis on the international market 
 
The international price of rubber greatly decreased, measured in US dollars in the period mid 
1996 to 1999.  However this decline started before the economic and monetary crisis, well 
before the last quarter of 1997 (Figs. 8.2 and 8.3), therefore independantly from krismon, at 
least , at the beginning . After a period of high economic activity and demand, circa 1980, the 
price that rubber commanded dropped after 1985 (partly due to the “second oil shock” and its 
economic aftermath). The price increased again in 1994-96, and this was due to large 
purchases from China, a significant increase of car sales in the USA and a decrease in 
stockpiled rubber, which led to important purchases by the industry (Loyen, 1998).  The price 
reached 160 US cents per kg in 1995.  After a short period of two  years and half, prices 
started to decline again  at the end of 1996, before krismon.  Since then the price of rubber 
has fallen constantly.  It dropped to 0.55 US cents per kilogram16 in June 1999.   
The main factors for this  decline in the price of rubber since  the end of 1996 seem to be as 
follows:  
- The world supply increased by 4 % when the demand increased only by 3.5 %. 
- Mainland China’s purchases came to a halt. 
- A world stockpile of 2 million tons at the end of 1996. (Sulkowski, 1997). 
  
Important rubber stocks in 1999 still weight on international rubber prices. The rate of 
growth for rubber supply was higher than that of demand several months before the crisis 
and, logically, the international price was decreasing well before the crisis.  What is true is 
that the collapse of the currency led to an increase in rubber prices, in rupiah, at farm level 
(Fig. 8.3).  However, at least at that stage, there is little evidence to support the idea of any 
significant short-term supply response to this sudden price increase in rupiah, which could in 
its turn explain a drop in the international price in dollars. The decrease of the international 
price for rubber was compensated for by the collapse of the rupiah, which enabled the price 
of rubber to, roughly, triple during 2 or 3 months. Prices then decreased to only twice their 
pre-crisis level. As price of rubber is the major factor of the average income, expressed 
rupiah, the latter more or less followed the same trend.  However, beyond the average trend, 
farmers incomes vary among farmers who have clones and those who did not (see above).  
 
 
16 Price given for TSR 20 = Technically Specified Rubber grade 20, the grade most commonly used for tyre 
production. 
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4. Conclusion  
 
We should consider the consequences of the 1997-1999 period according to three main 
points: the real impact of krismon on households that depend on rubber for a living, the 
hidden impact of the rubber crisis and the aftermath in terms of farming systems evolution in 
the very next future. The latter is itself split in three components: the impact on planting and 
further investment in rubber, the competition for land with oil palm projects, and 
monocropping/agroforestry strategies. The conclusion ends up with the crisis seen as a 
revealing of past policy inefficiency. 
 
A rather neutral impact of Krismon on rubber farmers  
 
The exchange rate strongly affected the local prices of products and inputs in Indonesia.  The 
primary effect of this “dance of prices” in 1998 was to disorientate most farmers. Internal 
rubber prices have followed domestic food prices and the prices of some input materials 
available in the country (planting materials and fertilisers such as urea).  The value of rubber, 
in rupiah, was relatively high due to the fall of the currency.  This was compensated for by a 
decrease in the international price paid in US dollars.  Thus producers experienced no 
particular advantages or disadvantages.  Rubber farmers’ standards of living remain more or 
less the same, as incomes have been maintained. The poorest farmers, still relying on old 
jungle rubber have suffered to some extent because of the crisis, but their standard of living 
was already low before the crisis.  A similar situation may be observed amongst the Javanese 
transmigrants.  Farmers with early access to clonal rubber, mainly through projects, clearly 
benefited from krismon in 1998, but they are a minority among rubber smallholders.   
 
Most farmers seem to have tackled the crisis quite well, some by developing temporary non-
rubber based strategies (such as transmigrants). They developed more off-farm activities, 
sold some cattle and reduced meat consumption.  However, this optimistic scenario must be 
qualified by social considerations.  The selling of cattle is a risky strategy involving the 
liquidation of capital.  Increasing off-farm activities, being exploited by wage payers in large 
oil palm estates, is neither a sign of social development nor good news for the ecological 
environment. The fact that men are risking their lives in dangerous gold mines, involving 
months of separation from their families, may have enormous negative impacts on health and 
the security of the family unit.   
 
The links between the Asian crisis and the rubber crisis 
 
The “rubber crisis” refers to a constant decrease in price on the international market since 
January 1997. In 1997, the volatility of the rupiah has obscured this dramatic trend.  In 1998, 
the collapse of the rupiah attended a relatively good price to be maintained. It seems that the 
very short period of real price increase did not trigger a significant short-term supply 
response.  Even if this was attempted amongst a minority of smallholders, the effect was not 
significant and could not have really influenced Indonesian supply and international prices.   
 
However, it would be illogical to argue that the Asian crisis did not influence the 
international price of rubber.  As Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia account for 80% of the 
world’s rubber supply, what happened to their economies obviously had a direct impact upon 
the international rubber market.  Our conclusion is that the main impact of the Asian crisis, in 
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terms of international prices, was not demonstrated by a supply and response mechanism but 
rather by lower costs, expressed in dollars: end users took this opportunity to lower the price 
they paid.   However, the rubber price decline started before the crisis and appears to have 
been structural according to specific features not directly or consequently linked with the 
Asian crisis.  The Asian crisis was not the only factor to influence the fall in prices. The 
Asian crisis in it self has its origin partly on a too rapid economic globalization in Southeast 
Asia as well as in a financial and monetary crash.  The rubber crisis is more specific.   
 
Although most farmers overcame the ‘neutral’ krismon in 1998, they faced a real crisis with 
the further decline of the rubber price during the second half of 1999. Although fragile, the 
‘stabilisation’ of the rupiah in 1999 played a role inverse to that played by the 1998 krismon. 
 As a result of world price decline and rupiah stabilisation, farm-gate prices rapidly decreased 
in mid-1999. Farmers were just saved by a partial recovery of the world price at the very end 
of 1999. 
 
A very moderate impact of the 1998 crisis on rubber replanting and investments 
 
Krismon has highlighted the fragility of smallholders’ farming system, which relies solely 
upon old jungle rubber.  The need for the replanting and renewing of trees is not related to 
the crisis, but the crisis has shown it to be a necessity. In June 1999, 86% of farmers declared 
that they intend to plant or replant within the next 3 years.  For all those farmers who do not 
have access to oil palm projects, investing in clonal rubber is still the main strategy used to 
overcome the low productivity of jungle rubber. 
 
Whether or not to replant using clonal rubber is a decision which depends upon conditions 
widely independent of the fluctuating price of rubber, as long as rubber prices do not drop 
below a certain price threshold.  In fact, that threshold never seems to have been reached in 
the history of rubber production. The productivity trend has increased through the adoption of 
technology (clonal rubber and the monoculture package).  This is long term process, and is 
hardly affected by price fluctuations.  
 
The moderate price increase in rupiah in 1998 should not trigger specific new planting of 
rubber, at least not beyond what has already been planned by farmers. The trend towards 
planting clones existed before the crisis.  It was more developed in North and South Sumatra 
than in other provinces due to the important impact of rubber projects and the existence of a 
private nursery network, which provided sufficient clonal planting material for local farmers. 
 In the mid-1990s, in the province of South Sumatra, there were more than 500 private 
nurseries (Gouyon 1995).  There are probably many more by now, 1999-2000. In Jambi, 
private nurseries are booming as well (Penot and Komardiwan, 1998).  
 
Finally the 1998 crisis may have significantly accelerated new clonal plantings only in 
regions where farmers already had mature clonal planting and a pre-crisis strategy of active 
planting.  
 
On the opposite, in many regions and villages, the willingness of planting clonal rubber may 
be hampered by a new strong alternative, oil palm, emerging in the early 1990s and restarting 
in 1999 after a provisional slowdown in 1997/98. All surveyed farmers insist on the necessity 
of a movement towards clonal rubber from jungle rubber but also towards oil palm, when 
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possible. In old rubber areas, oil palm appears to be an important component of the 
“agricultural landscape”.  It is obviously becoming a serious alternative to rubber, 
particularly in provinces such as West Kalimantan, North Sumatra, Riau and Jambi.  
 
Competition for land by oil palm estates 
 
The oil palm estate sector has undergone spectacular growth in the last ten years and has 
provided local farmers who had access to with both job opportunities and the possibility of 
crop diversification. Of the 5.5 million ha conceded to private and governmental companies, 
2,4 million have been planted of which 1,78 million ha are in production (Potter and Lee, 
1998). West Kalimantan is the province with the largest recent development of oil palm. 
Therefore, with the plantings of 1996 and 1997 (which need maintenance) and those of 1999, 
to fulfill future needs, there is no prospect of rural job opportunities failing due to the crisis in 
the next few years. 
 
Oil palm estates and the contracts they offer to farmers clearly provide a new alternative, 
besides the clonal option, to jungle rubber.  Oil palm projects provide three main advantages : 
full credit to fund the planting phase,  an income comparable to that of clonal rubber and a 
reduced immature period (three years only).  These advantages pave the way for the 
movement of farmers towards this new crop option, at least for those contacted by private 
companies.  Full credit systems are welcome, even if credit conditions are not clear and even 
though 7,5 ha of land must be given in exchange 2 ha of oil palm four years later.  In West-
Kalimantan at least, the main outcome of the crisis has been that many farmers who might 
have hesitated to join oil palm projects are now willing to engage in such a strategy.  
Although some autochthon communities, like Sanjan, display a strong vision of their future 
and keep land for the next generation, most villages run to oil palm if a projects is available.  
In the mid-term, what is left for rubber? Beside, because land is becoming scarce, most 
farmers are unwilling to abandon rubber for the new ‘Cinderella’ crop, oil palm 
  
What is left to agroforestry strategies?  
 
With regard to rubber, the most important thing demonstrated by the crisis is that farmers 
definitely perceived the need to move towards the use of productive clones in their cropping 
systems in order to better secure their income beside increasing it.  Farmers need the high 
returns and early maturity provided by clones.  There is still a bright future for rubber 
smallholders, but complex jungle rubber based on seedlings and highly complex agroforestry 
is probably now lost forever. Farmers can no longer afford waiting ten years before getting 
returns from their rubber seedlings. This does not mean, however, that agroforestry strategies 
are incompatible with the use of clones. Some research is effectively currently implemented 
in Indonesia (CIRAD-ICRAF) and farmers display endogenous ability for exploring 
possibilities to use clones in light agroforestry systems rather than in monocropping. The 
latter is too capital-intensive during the investment phase and agroforestry strategies may 
reduce that investment. At least, that was researchers’ ambition (Gouyon 1993, Gouyon, 
Foresta and Levang 1993, Penot 1995, Penot and Gede Wibawa 1996, 1997).  The idea was 
not strictly to reproduce jungle rubber with clones, but to rebuild light agroforestry systems 
with a few useful species. 
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To some extent, in the 1990s, the farmers’ need for quick returns seems to have 
compromised the chances of adapting clones to agroforestry systems or adapting agroforestry 
strategies to the use of clones. However, in the 2000s, as roads are improving, and if 
agricultural policies refocus the fruit sector on smallholders, rather than on estates, a 
combination of rubber and several types of fruit trees may attract smallholders’ interest.  It is 
already the case in areas close to markets, close to provincial capitals. Agroforestry systems 
help to rebuild ecologies degraded by massive clearances, droughts and fires. They help to 
restore a “forest rent “ (Ruf, 1987).  Moreover, a complex agroforestry system makes 
replanting technically easier.  It may also help economically.  If a farmer can fell trees and 
sell the timber the money will help to fund replanting. Beyond these technicians’ arguments, 
it is believed that the crisis will help to reveal new possibilities in adapting clones to 
agroforestry systems or agroforestry to clones. 
 
The crisis as a revealing of a policy of inefficiency 
Structurally, with 2.5 million ha of jungle rubber to be replanted with clonal rubber and a 
enormous reserve of productivity, both in labour and land, it seems clear that the future of 
Indonesian rubber smallholders has great potential both economically and environmentally.  
Clonal plantations may help to improve and restore the environment in the long term, 
possibly through the use of some agroforestry techniques.   
The rubber sector is one of the best showcases with which to demonstrate the common roots 
of the economic and ecological crisis. Large-scale rubber schemes were costly and, some, the 
first ones in the 1970s’, riddled with corruption. They presented enormous logistical 
problems, with farmers sometimes receiving doubtful planting material, but eventually had  
real positive impacts in terms of the information they provided concerning rubber clones.  
However, by revealing the extent of environmental and social damage caused to rubber 
smallholders by estates and by logging companies (a number of which belonged to the 
Suharto family, their friends and the army), the crisis proved that these damages were 
aggravated, if not triggered by policies of ignorance, corruption and inefficiency (Chapter 6). 
 The crisis may appear ‘neutral’ within the rubber sector, but what is revealed is far from 
neutral.  It shows the immediate need for political changes in the rural sector.  It shows also 
the real necessity for producers to have the possibility to regroup themselves into farmers 
associations to defend their economic interest. 
Eventually, despite farmers’ willingness to move forward, the ecological and economic 
environments have been so badly damaged that the investment potential of rubber in the near 
future look less promising now than before the 1997 ecological crisis and the 1998 krismon.  
Again, as the main causes of the trouble stem from the policies of the large estates and the 
logging companies, rubber is one more sector which demonstrates the need to prioritize the 
smallholders.  These priorities should concern all aspects of agriculture and environment, 
from land management and land ownership, to information, credit facilities and the 
assistance provided to and by farmers’ organizations, which must remain under the farmers’ 
control. 
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